Cartels

The Full Bench of the Federal Court of Australia, has recently suggested that companies that engage in otherwise unlawful cartel-like conduct, or other anti-competitive conduct, while contracting with the government, might be immune from prosecution on the grounds of "Crown immunity", as long as the government is not "carrying on a business". On 22 September 2006, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) announced that it has sought special leave to appeal that decision to the High Court.

On 15 June 2007, the Australian Treasurer ordered an inquiry by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) into petrol pricing in Australia in response to widespread political and public debate about recent petrol prices in Australia being too high, and offshore price reductions being too slow to flow through to consumers. Whilst that inquiry will involve yet another general review of the oil industry in Australia, the ACCC has taken the opportunity to advise the Federal Government that it believes that Australian Cartel laws under section 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) may need to be tightened.

In January 2009, the Brazilian Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) executed the second administrative consent decree in the marine hoses cartel case. The settlement agreements were entered into by Manuli Rubber Industries Spa and Bridgestone Corporation. Investigations against the two companies have now been suspended and the charges against them will be dismissed, upon full compliance with the terms and conditions provided for in the agreements.

On 21 October 2008, the Argentine Antitrust Commission rejected claims filed by Baro Gas against Repsol YPF Gas SA (YPF Gas) alleging an infringement of the Argentine Antitrust Law.

Towards the end of 2005, inflation rates in Argentina rose, leading to price increases. The Ministry of Economy has, therefore, requested that the National Commission for the Defence of Competition (the Commission) conduct market investigations into the potential existence of cartel activity. The industries currently under investigation are plastic and plastic containers, the meat market, public works, work risk insurance and supermarkets. In the past, such investigations have resulted in the imposition of large fines.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is calling for comments on a review of its new Leniency Policy, which first came into force on 30 June 2003.

The Full Federal Court has held in ACCC v Cadbury Schweppes ([2009] FCAFC 32) that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) could not claim legal professional privilege over a number of witness statements (which it held as a consequence of its investigation into the Visy-Amcor cartel operation between 1999-2004), as it had filed and served those documents on its opponent, Visy, in earlier proceedings. As those documents came into existence as a result of information provided under the ACCC's cartel leniency policy, this update considers whether this means that companies should hesitate in taking advantage of the ACCC's leniency policy.

The Austrian Cartel Court, on the request of the Federal Competition Authority (BWB) and in co-operation with the Austrian Chamber of Labour, has imposed fines totalling EUR 70,000 on six driving schools in the area of Innsbruck for participation in a price-fixing cartel.

On 5 October 2007, Austrian Federal Competition Authority (FCA) applied to the Austrian Cartel Court for the imposition of a fine totalling EUR88 million on five Austrian elevator and escalator manufacturers for alleged illegal project allocation, price agreements and information exchange.

The Austrian Federal Competition Authority (FCA) has applied to the Cartel Court for fines to be imposed on seven driving schools in Tyrol for alleged price-fixing. Two of the driving schools co-operated with the FCA in accordance with the Austrian leniency programme.

The Austrian Supreme Court has confirmed the fines imposed on four companies for participation in a wholesale cartel in the chemicals sector.

The UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has recently announced that four British Airways (BA) executives (current and former) have been charged with cartel offences under section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002 in connection with the criminal investigation into price-fixing of fuel surcharges for long haul passenger flights. Specifically, they have been charged with having dishonestly agreed with others to make or implement arrangements which directly or indirectly fixed the price for the supply in the UK of passenger air transport services by BA and Virgin Atlantic Airways (Virgin Atlantic).

Bayer AG has agreed to plead guilty to participating in a criminal conspiracy to fix the price of synthetic rubber. As part of the proposed plea agreement, Bayer AG will pay a US$4.7 million criminal fine and assist the US Department of Justice (DOJ) in its ongoing investigation of the synthetic rubber industry.

On 4 April 2008, the Belgian Competition Council imposed a total fine of EUR487,755 on participants in a price-fixing and market-sharing cartel for the chemical BBP. All cartel participants were granted a reduction in fines under the Leniency Notice. Reportedly, this is the first time that the Belgian Competition Council has imposed a fine for a cartel in a case based on leniency applications.

In August 2005, a judicial settlement brought an end to the criminal investigation into the existence and activities of a cartel in the Brazilian flinstones market.

On 1 August 2007, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that British Airways PLC (British Airways) and Korean Air Lines Co. Ltd. (Korean Air) have agreed to plead guilty to two counts of fixing prices of passenger and cargo flights in violation of the Sherman Act and to pay separate US$300 million criminal fines. The US District Court for the District Court of Columbia accepted the plea agreements on 23 August 2007.

On 16 January 2008, the Bulgarian Commission for Protection of Competition (CPC) fined 13 manufacturers of vegetable cooking oil and their industry association (the Union of the Manufacturers of Vegetable Oils and Oil Products in Bulgaria (UMVOOPB)) for participating in cartel activities allegedly resulting in price-fixing. The total amount of the fines imposed exceeds 1.86 million Bulgarian levs (almost EUR1 million).

On 4 September 2007, the Brazilian Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) enacted Resolution No. 46, which allows for the settling of cartel investigations through administrative consent decrees. The Brazilian Congress had introduced an amendment to this effect to the Competition Act on 31 May 2007.

On 2 March 2005, the Competition Bureau announced a guilty plea and a $50,000 fine for a former executive's role in a price-fixing conspiracy in the graphite electrodes sector, in breach of the Canadian Competition Act.

In late August 2005, the Canadian Competition Bureau Bureau announced that the Federal Court had imposed fines on a number of companies for their involvement in a conspiracy to fix prices in Canada of nucleotides (flavour enhancers in soups, sauces, spices and other foods).

This article analyses DGIV's new anti-cartel unit and considers its likely impact. The article includes the views of the head of the new unit, Maurice Guerrin, and leading competition practitioners.

This article sets out how recent reforms of the EC competition regime are affecting the authorities' abilities to detect cartel activity and conduct investigations and considers the risk assessments a company should undertake in the new environment.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Argentina. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Austria. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Canada. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, whether immunity from civil fines is available for individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Finland. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Germany. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg. 

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Hong Kong. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Indonesia. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, whether immunity from civil fines is available for individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Mexico. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in the Russian Federation. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in South Korea. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Taiwan. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in the UK (England and Wales). The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

This tool enables subscribers to search the Country Q&A in the PLC Cartel leniency multi-jurisdictional guide by question and jurisdiction. Simply select the questions and the jurisdictions that you are interested in and click the "submit" button. Please note that the law stated dates for each jurisdiction covered may not be the same. To check the law stated dates for each jurisdiction, please visit the individual article. Please also note this project is currently being updated so the Q&A tool will not include all available jurisdictions in this subject area.

On 13 August 2009, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) notified and brought into force the Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations 2009. The Regulations grant the CCI the discretion to impose a lesser penalty for a cartel offence, in specified cases.

The ECJ has upheld a judgment imposing fines totalling more than EUR40 million on a number of chemical companies.

On 12 July 2007, the Chilean Anti-trust Court dismissed an action brought by the National Economic Prosecutor against the health insurance companies (known as ISAPRES) ING, Vida Tres, Banmédica, Consalud and Colmena for allegedly colluding in order to reduce the rates of coverage to their clients.

Following the recent introduction of a leniency programme in Chilean antitrust law, which will become applicable on 13 October 2009, the National Economic Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalia Nacional Economica) (FNE) has published draft guidelines for consultation.

The Supreme Court has rejected an appeal filed by the National Economic Prosecutor against a judgment issued by the Chilean Anti-trust Court dismissing a complaint filed by the Prosecutor accusing Compania de Petroleos de Chile (Copec), Esso Chile, Shell Chile and Petroleos Trasandinos YPF of concerted practices.

The recent case of replica football kit price-fixing has highlighted interesting questions on competition compliance and the activity that may amount to a concerted practice in the context of cartels, particularly for companies involved in vertical agreements where a network of dealers is involved.

On 24 July 2009, the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009, which introduces criminal sanctions for cartel conduct, became law in Australia. This update suggests nine simple questions for companies to consider when assessing their compliance with the new Act.

As part of a US Department of Justice (DOJ) criminal investigation of an international rubber chemicals cartel, two former executives of Crompton Corporation have agreed to plead guilty to participating in an international conspiracy to fix prices in the rubber chemicals market.

The Council of the Slovak Antimonopoly Office (the Council) has affirmed the decision of the Antimonopoly Office imposing fines on six building companies for participating in a cartel agreement in relation to a tender for a motorway construction contract.

On 8 July 2009, the Bulgarian Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC), assisted by the local police force, raided the premises of the Bulgarian Banks' Association in Sofia. The CPC acted on its own initiative, based on its suspicion of the existence of a cartel agreement between the members of the association with regard to interest rates applied to retail loans and deposits. The CPC stated that it has seized documents as well as data in electronic and other digital form. Prior to the raid, the CPC had obtained a judicial warrant from the competent administrative court in Sofia allowing it to enter the premises and conduct an active search.

Anti-cartel enforcement has been the subject of increased focus in recent years. This has led to the development of stricter systems and tougher penalties. This chapter examines aspects of the criminal provisions relating to cartel conduct in Canada, the US, the UK and Australia, including criminal penalties, types of cartel conduct, possible defences, corporate exposure to criminal prosecution and methods of reducing this exposure.

Based on an initiative of the Czech Competition Office, a new Criminal Code is about to introduce criminal sanctions against individuals who engage in hardcore cartels. Currently, the Competition Act allows administrative fines to be imposed on cartelists as corporate entities, but the Competition Office believes that there should be specific sanctions against individuals engaging in cartel activity. The threat of a criminal conviction and the possibility of a prison sentence should mean that individuals would think very carefully before participating in cartels. The introduction of the cartel offence into the draft Criminal Code is designed to enhance deterrence and enforcement of the competition rules.

The latest, and probably close to final, version of a Bill criminalising cartels in Australia has been published. This update considers what has changed in this latest version of the Bill and the implications of this on company directors and management.

On 5 February 2009, the Czech Competition Office issued a new decision under which it has imposed a total fine of CZK52.8 million (approximately EUR1.8 million) on three major bakeries in the Czech Republic for entering into a price-fixing agreement. The original decision, adopted by the Office in August 2006, was overturned by the competent Regional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. For the new decision, the Competition Office had to describe in more detail the modus operandi of the cartel and also to further specify the practices by which the cartel members violated the competition rules.

On 19 December 2006, the Czech Competition Office issued a new first instance decision imposing a total fine of CZK 55 million (approximately EUR1.8 million) on six Czech building societies for entering into an information-sharing agreement in breach of the Competition Act. This is one of the largest fines ever imposed by the Competition Office.

On 19 July 2007, the Competition Office of the Czech Republic issued a first instance decision imposing fines totalling CZK14.208 million (approximately EUR0.5 million) on seven Czech poultry producers. The Competition Office's press release states that the poultry producers violated the Competition Act by entering into a prohibited price-fixing agreement.

On 8 January 2008, the Regional Court of Brno, handling appeals in competition cases, annulled the Competition Office's decision of 18 April 2007 ito impose a total fine of CZK55 million (approximately EUR1.8 million) on six Czech building societies for their involvement in an unlawful information exchange agreement.

On 2 October 2007, the Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) partially upheld a decision of the Danish Competition Council (Council) which found that seven small Danish banks had entered into an illegal market-sharing agreement, in breach of section 6 of the Danish Competition Act (the Danish equivalent to Article 81 of the EC Treaty).

On 4 October 2007, the District Court of Horsens, Denmark, handed out fines to the "Danish Inns and Hotels" association, as well as to its managing director and the chairman of its board, for infringing section 6 of the Danish Competition Act (the Danish equivalent to Article 81 of the EC Treaty). This is only the second time that a personal fine has been issued in a case involving infringements of the Competition Act.

The Eastern Division of the Danish High Court has found a company guilty of illegal price co-ordination in connection with tendering procedures within the electricity industry. A fine of DKK 74,000 was imposed on the company.

The Austrian Cartel Authority has assisted the European Commission with unannounced dawn raids in the bathroom fittings sector.

In a speech to two Swedish construction industry associations, the head of the Swedish Competition Authority has advocated the barring of cartel culprits from tendering in public procurement procedures.

On 16 November 2006, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced another guilty plea resulting from its investigation of a global conspiracy to fix the price of dynamic random access memory (DRAM). A former executive of Elpida Memory, a large Japanese manufacturer of DRAM, has agreed to plead guilty, pay a US$250,000 criminal fine, and serve prison time in the United States for participating in the DRAM cartel.

On 6 January 2009, the Estonian Ministry of Justice published draft amendments to the Estonian competition law which establish a new leniency programme. The draft amendments also specify principles in relation to criminal sanctions for cartel offences.

The Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has announced that Elpida Memory Inc. (Elpida), a Japanese manufacturer of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) products, has agreed to plead guilty to charges of price-fixing and bid-rigging in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In connection with the guilty plea, Elpida agreed to pay a fine of US$84 million. Elpida also has agreed to cooperate with the DOJ's ongoing investigation in the industry.

On 21 September 2006, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Thomas Quin, an executive of Samsung Semiconductor Inc, based in San Jose, California, has agreed to plead guilty to a charge that he participated in a global conspiracy to fix DRAM prices as part of a plea agreement in which he agreed to serve jail time.

The Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) has fined Lukoil and Rusneft RBL80 million for illegal collusion in relation to petrol price increases. This decision comes as the FAS alters its fining policy in order to increase the level of the fines that it imposes.

On 30 April 2009, the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS Russia) initiated a case alleging breach of Article 11 of the Federal Law on Protection of Competition (which prohibits anti-competitive agreements and practices) against a number of Moscow hoteliers.

The Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) suspects that the forestry companies Metsäliitto Osuuskunta, UPM-Kymmene Oyj and Stora Enso Oyj have been engaged in illegal price co-operation and information exchange in order to reduce competition between them in wood procurement. On 12 April 2006, the FCA informed the companies of the results of its investigation. The companies now have the opportunity to respond to the FCA's findings, following which the FCA will decide whether to bring the case before the Market Court.

The Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) has proposed that the Market Court impose fines of EUR30 million on Stora Enso Plc and EUR21 million on Metsaliitto Osuuskunta for co-operating in pricing and exchanging information on the procurement of timber during the period 1997-2004. The FCA granted immunity from fines to the third participant in the alleged infringement, UPM-Kymmene Plc, following its leniency application in May 2004. In addition, Metsaliitto Osuuskunta received a 30% reduction in its proposed fine, for assisting the FCA in the investigation.

On 16 February 2007, the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) issued its ruling in a case concerning alleged competition restrictions in the roofing felt market. The FCA decided not to impose penalties on three companies for exchanging confidential business information.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has fined 345 construction companies over EUR100 million for participation in a cartel, using an accelerated sanctions procedure.

On 19 December 2007, the Finnish Market Court imposed total fines of EUR19.4 million on seven asphalt companies that had colluded to fix prices and share markets in the period 1994-2001.

The UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has recently announced the first ever convictions for cartel offences under the Enterprise Act 2002. Almost five years after the introduction of criminal sanctions for cartel activities, three UK businessmen have been sentenced to imprisonment for periods of between two and a half and three years. All three pleaded guilty to dishonestly agreeing to allocate markets and customers, restrict supplies, fix prices and rig bids relating to the supply of marine hose and ancillary equipment in the UK. The three defendants were also disqualified from acting as company directors for between five and seven years.

While processing a merger notification in the market for natural gas, the Swedish Competition Authority received indications of a breach of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, leading to dawn raids in Sweden in Denmark. The merger itself was cleared after the acquiring company gave commitments.

On 30 January 2009, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that a former shipping executive was sentenced to serve 48 months - the longest sentence imposed to date for a single antitrust violation - and to pay a US$20,000 fine for participating in a conspiracy to eliminate competition for freight shipping services between the continental United States and Puerto Rico.

The French Competition Council has decided that a cartel of companies has been involved in anti-competitive behaviour in relation to a tendering process.

On 20 December 2007, the French Competition Council fined five toy suppliers and three retailers a total amount of EUR37.5 million for anti-competitive resale price agreements, which aimed to prevent any price competition during the holiday periods of 2001-03.

On 11 June 2008, the Competition Council imposed fines amounting to a total of EUR1,680,000 on two companies for having exchanged price information regarding invitations to tender.

On 30 November 2005, the French Competition Council found the three mobile operators Orange France, SFR and Bouygues Telecom guilty of having engaged in anti-competitive practices infringing Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article L.420-1 of the French Code of Commerce. In view of the seriousness of the breach, the Council imposed the highest fines imposed so far, amounting to a total of EUR 534 million. The Council also ordered the publication of the decision in two of the most popular national daily newspapers.

Recent weeks have seen the conviction of certain defendants for offences arising from an Irish heating oil cartel that operated in the west of Ireland between January 2001 and February 2002.

In a nationwide action on 3 May 2005, the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) searched a total of 12 properties belonging to undertakings in the liquefied gas sector. The Bundeskartellamt has not yet revealed the identity of the undertakings concerned.

The German Federal Supreme has ruled that the action for cartel damages brought by Belgian private antitrust enforcement company Cartel Damages Claims (CDC) against members of the cement cartel is admissible. The Federal Supreme Court dismissed a final appeal against the admissibility of the claim, stating that no fundamental legal questions had been addressed.

On 14 November 2005, Mr JP Lambe pleaded guilty to the charge of aiding and abetting cartel members in rigging the market for domestic heating oil in Counties Galway, Mayo and Roscommon in the west of Ireland.

On 6 May 2008, the Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasagi Versenyhivatal (GVH)) announced that it had initiated proceedings against Samsung SDI Co Ltd, Samsung SDI Germany GmbH, Samsung SDI Magyarorszag Zrt, Thomson TDP sp Zoo, LG Philips Displays Czech Republic sro, LP Displays, Chunghwa Pictures Tubes (UK) Ltd, Chunghwa Pictures Tubes Ltd, Daewoo Orion SA, Daewoo Electronics Global HQ, Daewoo Electronics European HQ, MT Picture Display Germany GmbH, Matsushita Global HQ and Matsushita European HQ.

On 29 July 2008, the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) issued a decision following an ex officio investigation into an alleged cartel between a number of banks in relation to the determination of the applicable inter bank charges for the provision of inter bank services. Following a number of hearings and discussions between the banks and the HCC, the HCC has decided to accept a number of commitments proposed by the banks and to bring its investigation to an end.

On 12 September 2007, the Austrian Cartel Court of Appeals upheld a decision of the Cartel Court and increased from EUR5 million to EUR7 million a fine imposed on Europay Austria (Europay) for abuse of a dominant position and infringement of the cartels prohibition.

The Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (the Office) has decided to impose a fine of 0.05% of the turnover, in total SKK 1,693,500 (approximately EUR 43,490) on more than 40 Slovak pig breeders for the conclusion of a horizontal price cartel agreement that distorted competition in market for pork meat in Slovakia.

Following a UK House of Lords ruling on 12 March 2008, Ian Norris, former Chief Executive of Morgan Crucible, will have a further opportunity to fight extradition to the United States. Mr Norris, who is wanted by the US for his alleged participation in a price-fixing conspiracy, has been resisting extradition for five years.

Hungarian Competition Office (GVH) officials have carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of the following brokerage companies: Buda-Cash Brókerház Zrt, Concorde Értékpapír Zrt, Equitas Bróker Rt, Erste Befektetési Zrt, Budapest Stock Exchange Zrt, Cashline Értékpapír Zrt, az Equilor Befektetési Rt and HVB Bank Hungary Zrt.

The last 12 months have seen a marked increase in enforcement related activity by the New Zealand Commerce Commission.

This chapter examines important decision making and strategic considerations for any company faced with an international cartel investigation.

The Turkish Competition Board (the Competition Board) has recently applied the leniency rule for the first time in its Sinyalizasyon investigation. The Competition Board enforced the amended Article 16 of the Act on the Protection of Competition (the Competition Act), and granted immunity to Sinyalizasyon Elektronik İnsaat Sanayi Ticaret Ltd Sti (Sinyalizasyon Elektronik) against fines imposed under the Competition Act.

The Italian Antitrust Authority (the Authority) has fined eight manufacturers of chipboard EUR31 million for participating in a cartel. It has also granted complete leniency to the Trombini Group for alerting the Authority to the existence of the cartel by providing documentary evidence prior to any investigation. This is the first time that the Authority has applied the new leniency laws to grant exemption from fines.

On 3 August 2007, the Italian Competition Authority fined four companies a total of EUR3,995,820 for their involvement in an anti-competitive cartel agreement in relation to the supply of medical devices to an Italian Local Health Authority. The anti-competitive agreement prevented the companies from submitting tenders when invited by the Local Health Authority, which had the effect of reducing price competition.

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) has announced that Japan Airlines International Co. (Japan Airlines) has agreed to plead guilty and pay a US$110 million criminal fine in connection with an alleged conspiracy to fix the prices of international air cargo shipments.

Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) has decided that it will seek contractual damages against companies that commit bid-rigging infringements.

On 11 May 2005, the Fair Trade Commission of Japan (JFTC) filed an action with the Public Prosecutor General against eight companies for bid-rigging in connection with tenders for steel bridge construction projects of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.

On 18 February 2009, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) issued a cease and desist order and a surcharge payment order against two manufacturers of polyvinyl chloride pipes and joints for their participation in a price-fixing cartel.

On 22 June 2007, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) found that bid-rigging (a form of price fixing) by 60 companies in relation to construction work ordered by the Defence Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) constituted unreasonable restraint of trade in breach of Article 3 of the Anti-Monopoly Act.

On 27 June 2006, the Japan Fair Trade Committee (JFTC) issued a judgment condemning companies engaged in anti-competitive bid-rigging.

On 26 and 27 January 2009, the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS Russia) and the American Embassy in Moscow jointly held a workshop to discuss anti-cartel law and practice in the USA and in Russia.

On 4 August 2009, the Swedish Competition Authority (KKV) carried out a dawn raid at the premises of the major Swedish tour bus operators Scandorama AB and Olvemarks Holiday AB.

The Latvian Competition Council has closed its file in an investigation into a co-operation agreement entered into by three travel agencies in 2003. On the facts, the Competition Council found no evidence of price-fixing.

The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court has upheld an appeal against a decision of the Lithuanian Competition Council relating to a prohibited agreement concluded by undertakings engaged in waste management recovery and recycling.

On 23 October 2006, the Secretary of Domestic Trade (Secretary) and the National Commission for the Defence of Competition (the Commission) imposed fines of US$80,000 each on two natural gas suppliers in relation to their participation in a market-sharing cartel.

From February 2006, the Mexican Competition Commission (CFC) will apply an immunity/leniency programme, which will apply to the first, second and subsequent firms that come forward and provide substantial evidence as to their engagement and participation in an illegal cartel.

The Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) has taken the initiative of removing from ethical investment indexes and funds companies convicted of breaching competition regulations. The initiative was presented at the European Competition Authorities' 2008 Annual Meeting in Budapest.

The Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) has amended the Competition Act/Regulations in order to broaden the catchment area for the leniency rules and to safeguard the anonymity of those who provide information on infringements of competition rules.

The revised Austrian Competition Act and the new Cartel Act 2005, which will enter into force on 1 January 2006, introduce a rudimentary leniency programme in Austria.

Following the decision of the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) on the horizontal aspects of the dairy cartel case, in which the HCC imposed on local dairy producers its highest ever fines, on 19 December 2007, the HCC issued a decision regarding the vertical aspects of the milk cartel. This new decision related to alleged retail price-fixing arrangements between each major Greek local dairy producer and the major supermarket chains

On 22 August 2005, a new regulation was adopted allowing the Norwegian Competition Authority to fine undertakings who breach the Norwegian Competition Act fines of up to 10% of their turnover. The regulation also establishes rules on immunity from fines, or reduction of fines, for companies or individuals that co-operate with the Authority.

The New York Attorney General has alleged that several companies in the insurance industry engaged in anti-competitive business practices, including bid-rigging. Executives from several companies have entered guilty pleas and agreed to co-operate in the Attorney General's ongoing investigation in the industry. In addition, Marsh & McLennan Companies, an insurance brokerage firm, has agreed to provide US$850 million in restitution to policyholders and to change its business practices.

The New Zealand Commerce Commission has announced that it intends to review its leniency and co-operation policy to further assist with the detection of anti-competitive cartel behaviour.

The New Zealand Commerce Commission is alleging cartel behaviour in the timber preservatives industry and has filed civil proceedings in the Auckland High Court against four New Zealand companies and seven executives.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has brought an end to its investigation into possible anti-competitive behaviour by wholesale undertakings in the paper industry in The Netherlands.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has started an accelerated sanctions procedure against approximately 400 construction companies active in the earthworks, roadworks and hydraulic engineering sector, which it believes have infringed the Competition Act. This procedure has been specially designed to ensure that the imposition of fines occurs effectively and swiftly.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has adopted 18 decisions on administrative appeal relating to cartels in the housing and utility sector and the installation sector. With these decisions the NMa has concluded all administrative appeal procedures (more than 100 in total) in relation to its enforcement actions in the construction industry. The decisions on the appeals follow the sanctions that the NMa imposed on more than 1,000 construction firms in accordance with the accelerated and regular sanctions procedures.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has invited comments on its revised draft leniency guidelines. These set out the conditions under which companies and natural persons, having participated in a cartel, may apply for the reduction of a fine or complete immunity from fines. The new leniency guidelines constitute another important step in realising effective cartel detection and prosecution by the NMa.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has imposed fines amounting to EUR6 million on 10 fluid concrete production companies in the provinces of Zuid-Holland and Utrecht. These undertakings were found to have exchanged information amongst themselves about proposed price increases for fluid concrete in the period from 1998 up to and including 2002. The fines imposed on the individual companies range from EUR82,000 to EUR873,000.

The Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) has fined the members of two cartels in the painting industry. In addition, the cartel facilitator, which rigged bids for painting contracts with the Dutch Ministry of Defence, was fined for its role in the cartel.

Following a ruling of the Court of Rotterdam, the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has repealed its decision to impose a fine on Soletanche Bachy France S.A. and ten other producers of concrete cement.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has imposed fines totalling EUR2.7 million on suppliers of steel grates.

The Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) has imposed the first fines in the construction sector within the framework of the regular sanctions procedures. This relates to 14 undertakings in the civil engineering and infrastructure sector and nine undertakings in the installation engineering sector. The fines imposed amount to approximately EUR4.5 million.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has released a special film on its leniency programme. The aim of the film is to raise awareness of the leniency programme, both among professionals, businesses and the public at large. Under the leniency programme cartel participants can escape a fine altogether or be granted a reduction in fines if they confess their involvement to the NMa in a timely manner and provide information to help to prosecute the cartel.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has revised a sanctions decision following a ruling by the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (CBb)). As a result of the CBb's decision, the NMa has withdrawn a fine of almost EUR10 million that it had previously imposed on mobile telecommunications operator Orange.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has terminated its investigation into potential anti-competitive behaviour by a number of producers of generic medicines and their branch organisations. The investigation has so far yielded insufficient evidence to warrant further investigation.

The Norwegian National Authority for the Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (OKOKRIM) has imposed fines and ordered confiscation from nine firms in the asphalt and building industries for illegal market-sharing and price-fixing.

On 12 July 2005, the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) fined six roofing contractors a total of £138,000 for their involvement in price-fixing agreements, infringing Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998.

The UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has recently issued a Statement of Objections (SO) against 112 companies, which conduct general building work, in the public and private sector. The construction companies are alleged to have been involved in bid rigging activities in breach of the Competition Act 1998. In particular, the OFT alleges that the companies engaged in cover pricing with regard to public and private sector tenders, and that a relatively small number of companies also arranged for compensation payments to be paid to unsuccessful bidders.

On 29 February 2008, the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) announced a new policy under which it is prepared to pay financial incentives of up to £100,000 in exchange for information which would help the OFT to identify and take action against illegal cartel activities.

The President of the Office for Protection of Competition and Consumers (OPCC) has initiated competition law infringement proceedings against the establishment of a cartel by 64 Silesian estate agents.

Leniency programmes represent a key development in competition law enforcement both for competition authorities and undertakings. This chapter looks at the history, recent developments and future considerations for leniency programmes worldwide. It also sets out the key features of a successful leniency programme and the problems faced by potential leniency applicants.

On 12 December 2006, the Paris Court of Appeal rejected the appeals lodged by the three French mobile phone operators (Orange, SFR and Bouygues Telecom) against a decision given by the French Competition Council, which imposed fines totalling over EUR500 million on the three operators.

Penalties have been imposed on Osmose New Zealand, Osmose Australia and two Australian-based executives for liabilities arising from their involvement in a cartel in New Zealand's wood preservative chemicals industry.

After many years of apparently bearing the progressive increase in the market power of drugs distributors in Mexico, pharmaceutical companies have finally filed a complaint with the Mexican Federal Competition Commission (CFC) about what they consider to be an abuse of market power by these companies.

On 5 April 2006 the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) began criminal proceedings against five pharmaceutical companies who are alleged to have been party to price-fixing arrangements for the supply of generic drugs to the National Health Service (NHS). Also facing prosecution are nine individuals, currently or formerly employed by the companies. This is against the backdrop of civil proceedings issued by the Department of Health.

The President of the Urzad Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów (Office for Protection of Competition and Consumers) has adopted a decision finding that an agreement between eleven companies offering taxi services in Szczecin to fix prices has infringed Polish competition law.

The Portuguese Parliament has approved a bill, drafted by the Competition Authority, instituting a leniency regime.

The Portuguese Competition Authority (the Authority) has imposed fines totalling EUR310,000 on two participants in a cartel who rigged bids for a public tender for the supply of aerial forest fire fighting equipment.

The Portuguese Competition Authority has issued a new decision imposing fines on pharmaceutical companies for participation in a collusive bidding cartel relating to the supply of products for the diagnosis of diabetes. This decision follows two 2005 decisions which were subsequently sent back to the Authority by the Commercial Court of Lisbon, following appeals by the cartel participants.

Following proceedings lasting five years, the President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) has found that 20 banks entered into an unlawful agreement for the fixing of commission fees on sales outlets accepting Visa and MasterCard cards (interchange fees). The President of the OCCP has ordered discontinuation of the practice, which continued for 13 years, and imposed fines totalling approximately EUR41 million on the banks.

Within the last month, in three separate cartel investigations conducted by the Canadian Competition Bureau, an individual was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, Akzo Nobel Chemicals International BV was fined C$3.15 million and three Quebec construction companies and their presidents were charged with bid-rigging.

During July and August 2007, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) issued cease and desist orders against companies operating in the clothing distribution and polypropylene sectors.

The New Zealand High Court has fined Koppers Arch Wood Protection (NZ) Limited and its Australian parent company, Koppers Arch Investments Pty Limited, a total of NZ$3.6 million after they admitted participating in cartel behaviour in the wood preservative chemicals industry between 1998 and 2002.

The UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has published an interim report on the handling of applications under its existing leniency and no-action policies.

The Romanian Competition Council (RCC) has imposed fines exceeding RON1.5 million (approximately EUR360,000) on 32 driving schools for their participation in a cartel on the market for training services in Bucharest.

On 18 December 2007, the Austrian Federal Competition Authority (FCA) announced that it has applied to the cartel court for an imposition of a fine against a wholesaler in the chemical product sector. The application was based on a leniency application, which had been filed by another wholesaler with the FCA.

The Slovak Antimonopoly Office has fined three banks a total of EUR10.2 million for particiapting in a cartel whereby they closed and refused to reopen current accounts with a Czech company.

The Bratislava County Court has overturned a decision of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic which imposed a record fine on construction companies.

On 6 January 2009, the South African Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) confirmed the consent agreement reached between Foodcorp (Proprietary) Limited (trading as Sunbake Bakeries) (Foodcorp), a food manufacturer and distributor, and the Competition Commission (the Commission) in relation to Foodcorp's involvement in a bread price-fixing cartel. Foodcorp has been fined an administrative penalty of R45 million by the competition authorities.

The South African Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) has ruled that the Competition Commission (the Commission) should be allowed to amend its complaint referral against Sasol Chemical Industries, Yara South African and Omnia Fertiliser (the Respondents).

Tiger Consumer Brands Ltd (Tiger Brands) has reached a settlement with the South African Competition Commission (the Commission) regarding its participation in cartels in the bread and milling industries.

The South African Competition Commission has found evidence of collusion between pharmaceutical companies in relation to tenders issued by the Department of Health.

On 23 June 2008, the South African Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) dismissed points in limine raised by Clover Industries Limited (Clover) and Ladismith Cheese (Proprietary) Limited (Ladismith), against a referral made by the Competition Commission (Commission) to the Tribunal against Clover, Ladismith and five others.

On 20 May 2009, the South African Competition Tribunal heard an application to confirm the negotiated settlement between the Competition Commission and Sasol in relation to the conduct of Sasol Nitro's fertiliser and phosphoric acid businesses.

On 17 November 2008, the South African Competition Appeals Court (the CAC) dismissed an application by Clover Industries (Clover), Clover SA, Parmalat, Ladismith Cheese, Woodland Dairy, Lancewood, Nestle SA and Milkwood Diary (the Appellants) to have a case of alleged price-fixing against them thrown out.

On 19 May 2009, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) amended its guidelines for its Leniency Programme.

On 22 October 2007, the Comisión Nacional de Competencia (CNC) (Spanish National Competition Commission) fined four regional Saving Banks(Bilbao Bizcaya Kutxa (BBK), Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Guipúzcoa y San Sebastián-Guipuzkoa eta Donostiako Auredki Kutxa (KUTXA), Caja Vital (VITAL) and Caja Navarra (CAN)), a total of EUR24 million for entering into non-competion agreements.

On 14 August 2008, the Stavropol Office of the Federal Antimonopoly Service (OFAS Russia) found that Lukoil-Yurgnefteproduct Ltd., Rosneft - Stavropolye Oil Company OJSC, Bashoil - KMB Ltd., Stavneft Ltd., and Stavpromkomplekt PPK Ltd. have breached Article 11 of the Federal Law On Protection of Competition. OFAS Russia has issued a determination to eliminate the violations.

Damages have been awarded by an Austrian court for losses suffered by an individual as a result of an illegal cartel between driving schools in Styria.

On 23 October 2006, the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) announced that it had carried out dawn raids at three offices of the Swedish Glazier Industry Organisation (GBF), a service company owned by the industry association of the Swedish painting contractors, and two glazier companies whose executives were also officials in the trade organisation.

On 27 October 2005, the Swedish Competition Authority carried out a dawn raid at the premises of two companies which provide large-volume laundry services for several Swedish regional health care authorities.

On 17 January 2006, the Swedish Competition Authority carried out a dawn raid in northern Sweden at the premises of seven haulage companies suspected of dividing markets.

The Swedish Competition Authority has put together a checklist of 15 factors which indicate the existence of a tendering cartel between companies participating in a procurement process. The checklist is to be used by procuring companies to help them spot and report suspected cartels.

On 5 July 2006, the Svea Court of Appeals upheld an intermediate judgement against Swedish construction companies Skanska and NCC given by Stockholm City Court, stating that a party to an illegal tendering cartel may be held liable for damages. The liability was judged to encompass even those cartel members who had never entered into any contract with the party that suffered the consequences of the cartel, in apparent conflict with the wording of the relevant statute.

The Swedish Market Court has ruled in an intermediate judgment that an organisation is not exempt from antitrust liability where one unit of the organisation participates in a tendering cartel and the same organisation, through other business units, is also a customer of the companies in the cartel.

On 11 March 2005, the Swedish Competition Authority carried out its first dawn raids of the year. The dawn raids were conducted against companies in the chemicals distribution industry.

On 31 January 2008, the Swiss Competition Commission launched an inquiry into suspected anti-competitive practices in the electrical equipment industry in an unnamed major Swiss city by dawn-raiding the offices of the principal market participants.

On 23 March 2005, the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) imposed fines totalling EUR130 million on ten industrial insurers for participating in price-fixing.

This table is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of contents visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. Please note this project is currently being updated so will not include all available jurisdictions in this subject area.

On 3 February 2005, the Lithuanian Competition Council passed a decision concluding that the Lithuanian Association of Taxi Service Providers and some Vilnius taxi companies have breached Article 5 of the Lithuanian Competition Law.

On 9 April 2009, as a result of an ongoing investigation into the air transportation industry, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Cargolux Airlines International S.A. (Cargolux), Nippon Cargo Airlines Co. Ltd (NCA), and Asiana Airlines Inc. (Asiana) each agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to fix prices in the air cargo industry in violation of the Sherman Act and to pay a total of US$214 million in criminal fines. The DOJ also charged that Asiana fixed the prices of passenger fares for flights from the United States to Korea.

On 12 November 2008, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that three leading electronics manufacturers have agreed to plead guilty and pay a total of US$585 million in criminal fines for conspiring to fix prices in the sale of liquid crystal display panels. The firms include LG Display Co. Ltd. (LG), Sharp Corp. (Sharp), and Chunghwa Picture Tubes Ltd. (Chunghwa). Of the US$585 million in total criminal fines, LG will pay US$400 million, which is the second-highest criminal fine ever imposed by the DOJ's Antitrust Division. The DOJ filed its charges and the proposed settlement in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. In addition, the three companies have agreed to co-operate with the DOJ's ongoing investigation in the industry.

On 21 March 2007, the Turkish Competition Board imposed fines of TRY 6.2 million (approximately USD4.47 million) on 22 medical equipment companies for a number of competition law infringements, including price-fixing, in the cardiology medical equipment market.

Procompetencia, the Venezuelan Competition Authority, has fined a number of airlines for their involvement in a series of concerted practices designed both to lower the commissions paid to travel agencies and to exclude them from the market.

Enforcement action against international cartels is at an all time high, with growing co-operation among regulators. As well as analysing US and EU cartel law and leniency programmes, this feature provides practical guidance on how to withdraw from a global price-fixing arrangement.